We introduce a new condition, weak better-reply security, and show that every compact, locally convex, metric, quasiconcave and weakly better-reply secure game has a Nash equilibrium. This result is established using simple generalizations of classical ideas. Furthermore, we show that, when players' action spaces are metric and locally convex, it implies the existence results of Reny (Econometrica 67:1029(Econometrica 67: -1056(Econometrica 67: , 1999 and Carmona (J Econ Theory 144: [1333][1334][1335][1336][1337][1338][1339][1340] 2009) and that it is equivalent to a recent result of Barelli and Soza (On the Existence of Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous and Qualitative Games, University of Rochester, Rochester, 2009). Our general existence result also implies a new existence result for weakly upper reciprocally semicontinuous and weakly payoff secure games that satisfy a strong quasiconcavity property.
Introduction
The classical approach to the existence of Nash equilibrium in a normal form game consists in applying a fixed point theorem to its best-reply correspondence (e.g., Nash 1950). When discontinuities on players' payoff functions prevent this approach from being used, the classical solution consists in finding conditions that guarantee that the original game can be suitably approximated by a sequence of sufficiently well-behaved games in the following sense: a fixed point theorem can be applied to the best-reply correspondence of each of the approximating games, and the limit points the resulting Nash equilibria are themselves a Nash equilibrium of the original game (e.g., Dasgupta and Maskin 1986; Simon 1987; Simon and Zame 1990) . Clearly, an equally suitable approach is to use a fixed point theorem to guarantee the existence of ε-equilibrium in the approximating games, and to show that limit points of the resulting ε-equilibria, with ε converging to zero, are themselves a Nash equilibrium of the original game (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine 1986) .
In this note, we combine and generalize these ideas in order to obtain an existence theorem that, when players' action spaces are metric and locally convex, implies the main results of Reny (1999) and Carmona (2009) , and is equivalent to the generalization of Reny's theorem obtained by Barelli and Soza (2009) . In this way, these results are established in a relatively simple way using the classical ideas mentioned above.
The use of those classical ideas requires first a generalization of the notion of an approximate equilibrium. This is done by noting that a Nash equilibrium is a strategy yielding, to each player, a payoff at least as high as the value of his value function evaluated at the equilibrium strategies of the other players. Then, our notion of approximate equilibrium is obtained by replacing, in this definition of Nash equilibrium, each player's value function by a function strictly below it and defined also on the action space of the other players.
The next step in our approach is to define a condition, weak better-reply security, which guarantees that the original game is suitably approximated by a well-behaved game in the following sense: First, players' value functions in the approximating game are lower semicontinuous and can therefore be "closely" approximated from below by continuous functions; second, a fixed point theorem can be applied to a subcorrespondence of the approximate best-reply correspondence (in the approximating game) defined using those continuous functions; and, third, every limit point of the resulting approximate equilibria of the approximating game is a Nash equilibrium of the original game.
Clearly, this approach corresponds closely to the classical ideas discussed above, the main difference being that a single game, instead of a sequence of games, is used to approximate the original game (there are, however, important differences on how the main steps of the proof are established). As its name suggest, our condition generalizes the notion of better-reply security of Reny (1999) and is, in fact, equivalent to the notion of generalized better-reply security of Barelli and Soza (2009) . Furthermore, weak better-reply security also implies the (combined) notion of weak payoff security and weak upper semicontinuity considered in Carmona (2009). Thus, in the case where players' action spaces are metric and locally convex, Theorem 3.1 in Reny (1999), Corollary 6.8 in Barelli and Soza (2009) and Corollary 2 in Carmona (2009) 
